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Exchange Rates and U.S. Auto Competitiveness
ABSTRACT
This paper develops unique disaggregated data for three U.S. automakers and
three Japanese to assess how changes in exchange rates, factor costs, and volun-
tary export restraints have affected recent price competitiveness in the U.S.
passenger car market.
We find support for several familiar relationships. The support provided
by the experience of the late 1970s is straightforward. The dollar's foreign-
exchange value fell below its historical trend, in both nominal and cost-
adjusted (real) terms, relative to the major suppliers ol U.S. auto imports.
U.S. price competitiveness tracked U.S. cost competitiveness quite closely,
as average prices of U.S. automakers rose more slowly than those of their
principal rival firms (all Japanese). "Misalignment" of the dollar toward
weakness by historical norms was reflected in competitive relative pricing by
U.S. auto firms, again with respect to a historical norm.
The support provided by the experience of the years 1980-1985 is more
complex and interesting. Strong offsetting forces appear to have been at work.
Relative to major auto suppliers, the effective nominal dollar rose gradually
toward its level of the mid-1970s, but the effective real "auto dollar" rose
much faster, increasing to a level well above its historical norm by early 1985.
U.S. cost competitiveness deterioriated not so much because of exchange rates,
but because unit labor costs in manufacturing rose in the U.S. relative to those
in major auto suppliers. U.S. auto price competitiveness began to deteriorate
correspondingly, but soon stopped, and instead improved gradually between 1982
and 1985, ending up at about the same level in 1985 as in 1980. The Voluntary
Restraint Arrangements (VRAs) with Japan, which began in 1981, seem to be the
explanation for why the negative effects of exchange rates and costs on U.S.
auto price competitiveness were offset. The VRAs are also a reason why average
prices of U.S. automakers rose faster than other U.S. prices as measured by the
consumer price index, and why in Japan, average prices on auto sales to the U.S.
rose much faster than other Japanese prices. In sum, "misalignment" of the
dollar toward strength by historical norms and deteriorating labor cost com-
petitiveness, which tended to undermine the competitiveness of U.S. auto firms,
were offset by the Japanese VRAs, which buttressed it. The VRAs, however,






(608) 263-3867/3876INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
This paper develops unique disaggregated data to assess howchanges in
exchange rates, factor costs, and voluntary export restraints have affected
recent price competitiveness in the U.S. passenger car market. The changes
share a common feature. Each alters the relationship of the auto sector's
prices abroad to those at home. This would seem in turn to influence various
measures of competitiveness in predictable ways; indeed that is one of the
principal purposes of sectoral policies like voluntary export restraints.
Such sectoral policies also alter the relationship of the auto sector'sprices
to prices of other goods.
We find support for several familiar relationships. The support provided
by the experience of the late 1970s is straightforward. The dollar's foreign-
exchange value fell below its historical trend, in both nominal and cost—
adjusted (real) terms, relative to the major suppliers of U.S. auto imports.
U.S. price competitiveness tracked U.S. cost competitiveness quite closely,
as average prices of U.S. automakers rose more slowly than those of their
principal rival firms (all Japanese). "Misalignment" of the dollar toward
weakness by historical norms was reflected in competitive relative pricing by
U.S. auto firms, again with respect to a historical norm.
The support provided by the experience of the years 1980-1985 is more
complex and interesting. Relative to major auto suppliers, the effective
nominal dollar rose gradually toward its level of the mid—1970s, but the
effective real "auto dollar" rose much faster, increasing to a level well
above its historical norm by early 1985. U.S. cost competitiveness
deterioriated not so much because of exchange rates, but because Unit labor2
costs in manufacturing rose in the U.S. relative to those in major auto
suppliers. U.S. auto price competitiveness began to deteriorate
correspondingly, but soon stopped, and instead improved gradually between
1982 and 1985. The Voluntary Restraint Arrangements (VRAs) with Japan,
which began in 1981, seem to be the explanation for why the negative effects
of exchange rates and costs on U.S. auto price competitiveness were swamped
between 1982 and 1985. Average prices of U.S. automakers in fact rose more
slowly than those of Japanese rival firms over this period; but they rose
faster than other U.S. prices as measured by the consumer price index. In
Japan, average prices on auto sales to the U.S. rose much faster than other
Japanese prices.
"Offsetting strong forces" seems the best phrase for summarizing U.S.
auto price competitiveness in the early 1980s. Average prices of U.S.
automakers were at about the same level relative to Japanese rivals in 1985
as in 1980. "Misalignment" of the dollar toward strength by historical norms,
and deteriorating labor cost competitiveness, which tended to undermine the
competitiveness of U.S. auto firms, were offset by the Japanese VRAs, which
buttressed it.
To arrive at these conclusions, we compiled a unique data set for effective
exchange rates relevant to auto trade and for three U.S. automakers and three
Japanese. The data were aggregated in ways suitable to detecting the influence
of exchange rates, factor costs, and voluntary export restraints. Existing auto
data, although abundant, was unsuitable for our purposes --inadequately
disaggregated or inappropriately (even peculiarly) aggregated.3
I. INADEQUACIES IN EXISTING DATA
Studies of recent U.S. auto trade1 encounter a number of dataproblems.
Lack of data is not one. There is a veritablecar-nucopia of facts and
figures. Yet not many are in a format suitable forempirical analysis.
There are at least four important difficulties, eachof which is addressed
in this paper.
(1) Lack of Suitable Exchange-Rate Series. Most researchersare confident
that exchange rates have had some important influenceon recent U.S. auto
trade. Those who have attempted to estimate ithavegenerally employed
bilateral rates (e.g. between yen and dollars)or measures of overall effec-
tive exchange rates --basedon aggregate trade dependence in all products.2
Over most of the 1970s and 1980s, however,more than 90 percent of U.S. trade
in passenger cars has involved just threetrading partners: Canada, Germany,
and Japan. An attempt is made below tocompute effective exchange rates for
these three suppliers and Britain that are"aPpropriate" for U.S. passenger-
car imports. Some surprising insightsemerge.
(2) Lack of Suitable Disaggregatjon. Some of the mostreadily accessible
series on autos lump all domestic supplierstogether, and their counterparts
for U.S. auto imports lump all foreignsuppliers together. This causes
difficulties in several ways. First, exchange ratesamong the various import
suppliers have moved quite differently over the past fifteenyears. Second,
during the 1980s U.S. imports from Japan were restrained, and theeffects of
such discriminatory restraints on aggregate datamay be hard to detect if
imports from Canada or Europe expanded through trade diversion(see Dinopoulos
and Kreinin (1987)). Third, the U.S. and Canadaproduce virtually identical
passenger cars and intra-corporate trade is free of border restraint; forsome4
purposes, it may be better to count net auto imports from Canada as part of
the U.S. auto sector, rather than as shipments from "abroad." Fourth, firm-
by—f irm competitiveness is interesting in its own right: General Motors (GM)
and Honda may be more sheltered than other firms from exchange rates because
of their global diversification. Disaggregation along all these lines is
begun below, again with some surprising insights.
(3) Inadequate Price Indexes. A number of price indexes for autos exist,
yet some of the indexes mix together domestic and imported auto prices, and
some mix together new and used car prices. Other indexes are relative
newcomers, and many of the indexes are incestuously related to each other.3
A first-pass attempt is made below to construct several price indexes that
would be helpful for empirically assessing the impact of trade policy and
exchange rates on the U.S. auto market.
(4) Inadequate Measures of "Real" Variables. Some "real" variables that
are available are untrustworthy principally because of the inadequate price
indexes.4 Other "real" data embody a surprising tolerance forsimply adding up
numbers of autos produced and imported, as if relative prices of foreign and
domestic cars, large and small cars, stripped-down and spruced-up cars were
always the same. An attempt is made below to recompute several important
real variables for the auto sector as a natural extension of having recomputed
the price indexes.5
II. EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES FOR U.S.
PASSENGER AUTOMOBILES
Central to any assessment of how exchange rates affect U.S. auto
competitiveness are measures of what is meant by "exchange rates" and
"competitiveness." This section evaluates alternative measures of effective
exchange rates for passenger automobiles in the U.S. market and one measure
of U.S. auto cost competitiveness, comparing them to their counterparts for
overall trade. Section III examines alternative measures of the price com-
petitiveness of U.S. automakers and their Canadian affiliates relative to
Japanese automakers and their U.S. affiliates, and assesses their co-variation
with the auto exchange rates calculated below.
Figures 1 through 5 record six alternative measures of effective nominal
auto exchange rates for the United States since 1974, computed quarterly.
Figure 6 compares one of these to a labor-cost-adjusted ("real") measure of
auto exchange rates. An "effective" exchange rate is a weighted average
of bilateral exchange rates, where the weights often reflect trading-partner
transaction shares. In all tables the weights are the value shares of total
U.S. passenger-car imports accounted for by Britain, Germany, and Japan, with
and without Canada.5 Bilateral exchange rates are expressed as index numbers
of the strength (price) of the "auto dollar," with March 1973 =100.
These series for the "auto dollar" are arguably broader measures of
exchange-rate pressures on U.S. auto manufacturing than the bilateral
exchange rates used in other research. Effective exchange rates like these for
other sectors have also been calculated recently by Arndt (1986), Belongia
(1986), Clifton (1985), Dutton and Grennes (1985), Hartman (1986), and Marston
(1986).6
The first important question in calculating a measure of the "auto dollar"
is whether the Canadian dollar should be included or excluded. In principle,
the answer depends on the purpose of the calculation. Inclusion seems
advisable for purposes of assessing the impact of exchange rates on U.S.
geographical variables such as auto employment. Exclusion seems advisable
for purposes of assessing the impact of exchange rates on U.S. corporate
variables such as Chrysler Corporation market share --Chrysleris free to
trade across the U.S.-Canadian border without barriers. Inclusion or
exclusion of Canada makes a significant difference in measuring the exchange
value of the "auto dollar." Two issues that turn out to make much less dif-
ference are whether the effective exchange-rate index should be fixed-weight
or current-weight, and whether fixed weights should represent trade shares
from distant periods or from recent periods.6
Figures 1, 2, or 3 reveal the effect of Canada's inclusion or exclusion for
alternative weighting schemes. Figures 1 and 2 differ from Figure 3 in
displaying fixed-weight indexes. One set of fixed weights represents average
value shares of U.S. passenger-car imports over the period 1972-1976. These
weights were chosen to make the auto indexes as comparable as possible to the
Federal Reserve System's index of the overall weighted-average value of the U.S.
dollar, based on 1972-1976 global trade of the Group of Ten countries plus
Switzerland. This aggregate index is plotted in Figure 1 for reference, is also
equal to 100 in March, 1973 and is published monthly in the Federal Reserve
Bulletin.7 The other set of fixed weights representsaverage value shares of
U.S. passenger-car imports over the first two quarters of 1980. These weights
were chosen because the period from late 1979 to late 1980 is often thought to
represent a watershed in a number of ways for both auto trade and global econo-





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































indexes. Each period's set of bilateral exchange-rate indexes is weighted by
that period's value shares of trade. In general the choices of weighting system
and of base year for the fixed weights make very little difference to the effec-
tive value of the "auto dollar." This can also be seen in either Figure 4 or
Figure 5, where the alternative time trajectories for the effective "auto
dollar" are tightly packed together.9
Excluding Canada makes a significant difference. The U.S. dollar was
much weaker during most of the period in its command over non-Canadian autos
than in its command over Canadian autos (which are, of course, usually iden-
tical to U.S. manufactured models). This finding arises, naturally, from
the general weakening of the Canadian dollar, but its implications for U.S.
auto competitiveness need emphasis. The exchange rate between the U.S. and
Canadian dollar since the mid 1970s has worked against U.S. geographical
competitiveness in auto production. One can interpret the gap between the
trajectories in Figures 2 or 3 as one component of a Canadian "competitiveness
edge" in autos, which developed in the late 1970s and which has been more or
less stable since then. This edge may have little impact on the global com-
petitiveness of integrated U.S. automakers (GM, Ford, Chrysler) but a large
impact on where in North America they expand and contract)0 A second
important question in calculating a measure of the auto dollar is whether the
"real" auto dollar moves differently than the nominal. One familiar way of
measuring a real exchange rate is to adjust the nominal exchange rate for rela-
tive national factor costs. Indexes of Unit labor costs are often employed for
this purpose. In focussing on auto competitiveness, the natural choice might
seem to be unit labor costs among major producing countries in that sector
alone. Yet unit labor costs in all manufacturing, not just the auto sector,































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































producers --pressuresbeyond their ability to influence, in the same way as are
exchange-rate pressures. We have chosen this method of cost adjustment below.
It is a way of detecting how endogenous auto price competitiveness measured in
Section III corresponds to (arguably) exogenous cost and exchange-rate pressures
measured in this section. Our inferences are, of course, less meaningful the
more insulated or divergent are labor-cost trends in each country's auto sector
from labor costs in other sectors.
Figure 6 reveals the effect of adjusting the nominal auto dollar for
manufacturing unit labor costs in the U.S. relative to manufacturing unit
labor costs in rival automaking countries.11 Fixed weights are used in
averaging cost trends across Britain, Germany, and Japan (Canada excluded),
for 1972-1976 trade shares as described above. The resulting cost—adjusted
exchange-rate index can be called a measure of the "real" auto dollar, but
is more revealingly a measure of the cost competitiveness of the U.S. auto
sector. Figure 6 shows that there is a significant difference between auto
cost competitiveness measured by the real auto dollar and the contribution
that the nominal auto dollar alone makes to it.
Taken together, Figures 1 through 7 reveal some striking observations on the
effective value of the U.S. dollar for purposes of assessing U.S. auto
competitiveness.
(1) The nominal "auto dollar" has been far weaker than the overall nominal
dollar ever since 1975, as Figure 1 reveals. Focussing on nominal rates alone
makes it appear that U.S. automakers were protected more by the general
weakening of the dollar in the late 1970s than other U.S. producers;12 and
that U.S. automakers were penalized less by the general strengthening of the


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of the mid—1970s are taken as an alignment norm, Figure 5 shows that the nomi-
nal auto dollar has been weaker than "normal" from 1977 to date except from
early 1984 to early 1985. By this norm the past fifteen years' nominal
exchange rates have almost all been pro-competitive (or protectionist) for
U.S. auto firms, and not just those of the late 1970s.
(2) But the account is quite different for the "real" auto dollar. The
cost-adjusted auto dollar of Figure 6 tracks the nominal auto dollar reasonably
closely during the 1970s. Adjusting for trends in unit labor costs in the U.S.
and its auto rivals if anything accentuates the pro-competitive weakening of the
dollar in this period. During the 1980's, however, the parallelism between real
and nominal measures vanishes. The real auto dollar becomes progressively
stronger than the nominal beginning around 1979. A marked anti-competitive rise
in unit labor costs in the U.S. relative to the (auto-trade-weighted) average of
Unit labor costs in Britain, Germany, and Japan essentially eclipses the pro-
competitive sluggishness with which the nominal auto dollar creeps back toward
its historical norm.13 The result is remarkably similar 1980s trajectories for
the overall nominal dollar in Figure 1 and the real auto dollar in Figure 6.In
other words, whatever the advantage that the U.S. auto sector enjoyed in the
1980s relative to other U.S. producers from confronting rivals whose curren-
cies fell relatively slowly, this advantage was offset by a rapid rise in U.S.
unit labor costs relative to these same rivals. In fact, it was perhaps more
than offset, as the next paragraph suggests.
(3) The real "auto dollar" tracks the overall real dollar reasonably
closely during the 1970s, as Figure 7 reveals. During the 1980s, however,
the real auto dollar rose progressively more steeply than the overall real
dollar. So when exchange rates are adjusted for Unit labor costs relative17
to principal foreign rivals, the U.S. auto sector appears increasingly
uncompetitive in world markets relative to other U.S. producers during the
1980s14 --whereasunadjusted nominal exchange rates suggested exactly the
opposite. 1980s trajectories for the overall dollar and the "auto dollar"
have an opposite relation to each other in Figure 1 (nominal trends) and
Figure 7 (cost—adjusted trends).
Exchange rates and factor costs are obviously some of the most important
exogenous contributors to sectoral competitiveness.15 We turn in the next
section to two of its most important indicators, relative product prices and
market shares.16 We see if we can detect any of the expected correlations bet-
ween relative prices or market shares and exchange rates or factor costs. The
indicators of auto competitiveness we calculate are unique, applying to the
three largest integrated North American automakers and to their largest three
rivals (all Japanese).18
III. PRICE COMPETITIVENESS FOR U.S.
PASSENGER AUTOMOBI LES
To what extent did U.S. auto prices and market shares reflect the
international cost and exchange-rate pressures described above? To what
extent did they reflect other important changes, such as the Japanese VRAs?
This section attempts an answer by describing measures of prices and market
shares in the U.S. auto market and assessing their co-variation with
exchange rates, factor costs, and trade policy. Because of inadequacies
in existing data aggregates (described in Section I), data were collected and
constructed for the six firms with largest recent passenger car sales to U.S.
buyers. The data were then re-aggregated with an eye to detecting the co-
variations of interest. The six largest suppliers were General Motors (GM),
Ford, Chrysler, Toyota, Nissan, and Honda. A Data Appendix to this paper outli-
nes details for what follows, and is available from the author on request.
Disagregated Prices by Firm. The U.S. Department of Commerce regularly
publishes data on average transaction price per new car, broken down by U.S.
domestic sales and imports.17 Through 1985, the U.S. International Trade
Commission regularly published data on maximum and minimum retail list prices by
domestic and foreign automaker.18 Remaining retail prices are, of course,
distributed between the maximum and minimum in a way that could be described by
a frequency distribution--one for each automaker. By assuming that each auto-
maker has a comparable and symmetric distribution of model list prices between
its own unique maximum and minimum, yet around the relevant average transaction
price,19 we have blended the two data sources to obtain a time series ofaverage
transactions price per new car for each of the six largest automakers.












































































































































































































































































































































normalized so that 1982's price =100.Several features are notable. One is
that some U.S. firms' average prices turn down after 1983, not only because the
component price indexes do (e.g. Chrysler's maximum prices), but because U.S.
automakers' market share of the highest-price models begins to fall of f.20 A
second feature is that variation across firms in these price trajectories is
quite moderate, and especially slight for the Japanese firms.21 Third, as a
result, there is little indication that exchange rates or other exogenous fun-
damentals affect different Japanese firms differently or different U.S. firms
differently. One might have surmised some such differences due, for example, to
different multinationality of production among the firms (GM and Honda having
more multinationality than others). In this regard there is only a very slight
tendency for GM prices to be more stable over the period than Ford or Chrysler
prices.
U.S. and Japanese Auto Price Indexes. These disaggregated average price
indexes were then aggregated across firms by nationality to obtain an index of
U.S. auto prices and an index of Japanese auto prices, both measuring average
transaction prices on sales to U.S. buyers. Each index was a current-period
weighted average of three firms' average prices, with weights representing
each firm's share of "real" (constant 1982 dollar) U.S. sales of passenger
cars.22
Figure 10 plots the resulting indexes and Figure 11 normalizes them by the
U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI for all items). Table 1 records the year-to-
year change in the U.S. auto price index relative to that for the Japanese
firms. Several observations are notable.
(1) The 1970s feature auto price variation that is consistent in a
straightforward way with the trends in the nominal and cost-adjusted exchange
















































































































































































































































































































































































































1General Motors, Ford, Chrysler
2Toyota, Nissan, Honda




















(U.S. price competitiveness improves) as the auto dollar declines from 1977
through 1979, and by a roughly comparable magnitude.
(2) The 1980s feature auto price variation that is more complex and
more interesting. As the nominal and cost-adjusted auto dollar begin
rising after 1979, U.S. auto price competitiveness begins to decline (with a
slight lag) as expected. But it does not continue to decline as the dollar
continues to rise. On the contrary, U.S. auto price competitiveness improves
(U.S. auto prices fall relative to Japanese) from 1982 through 1985. This
improved price competitiveness is especially striking in contrast to the
deterioration in U.S. cost competitiveness suggested by the real exchange
rates of Figures 6 and 7. The contrast between price and cost competitiveness
hints at either a profit squeeze among U.S. automakers or a profit surge among
their foreign rivals on sales in the U.S. market.
(3) The Japanese VRAs and oligopol-istic auto market structure are
ingredients that give these trends explanation and coherence. Trends in cost
competitiveness and price competitiveness need not be parallel when abnormal
profits can persist due to entry barriers. Since a VRA pressures Japanese
suppliers to raise their prices relative to U.S. automakers, its effects
counteract the opposing pressures from the stronger dollar and rising U.S.
labor costs. Indeed, U.S. auto price competitiveness begins improving around
the time the VRAs are first imposed (Spring 1981), and relative
U.S.-to-Japanese auto prices end up in 1985 at roughly the same level as in
1980.
(4) Figure 11 shows how both auto price indexes begin rising relative to
other prices, as measured by the CPI, around the time that the VRAs are imposed.
This also is a familiar effect of a sectoral trade barrier, in contrast to26
exchange rates and labor costs, which should probably not be expected to produce
strong effects on auto prices relative to other prices.
(5) Figure 12 sheds interesting light on the possible benefits to
Japanese automakers of developments in the U.S. auto market, suggestive of
surging profits. It converts the dollar price index of Japanese sales in the
U.S. into yen (using the corresponding yen-dollar exchange rate), and compares
the implied yen price received to other Japanese prices, measured by their
GNP deflator. The yen price of autos exported to the U.S. rises steeply and
continuously from 1978 on, relative to other Japanese goods, signalling either
reallocation of production and resources toward U.S. activities in the
Japanese auto sector, in a competitive model, or rising profitability if
there are entry barriers.
"Real" Auto Sales and Market Shares. One of the products of the disaggre—
gation described above is an ability to refine aggregate measures of auto
sales volume, "real" market shares, and quantitative indexes. Instead of
simply adding together Units sold, as is the custom in many tabulations and
studies,23 we weighted each firm's unit sales by its average 1982 price, and
developed a time series for each firm of "real" (constant 1982 dollar) sales.
These were then aggregated to obtain a measure of "real" Japanese and U.S.
big-three auto sales in the U.S., along with corresponding market shares
which are often interpreted as ex post indicators of competitiveness.
Figure 13 shows how the U.S. market shares of the big-three Japanese
suppliers (Toyota, Nissan, Honda) vary over time if measured in units and if
measured in real terms. The real market shares lie uniformly below the shares
of units because 1982 prices of Japanese autos were below their U.S. equiva-



































































































































































































































































































this period, indexes of real change and measures of growth and are not much
affected by choosing simple or more refined aggregation of quantities. If there
had been sharper changes in average prices across Japanese firms, there would
have been less co-variation in the two series in Figure 13.
Figure 14 shows how mild recent variation has been in the real shares of
the six principal auto suppliers in their own summed sales.24 It also suggests
only modest co-variation with the exchange-rate and cost pressures described
above. The Japanese incursions of the late 1970s came in spite of adverse
trends in exchange rates, and at the expense of Ford and Chrysler. Ford's and
Chrysler's gradual rebound in the 1980s came at the expense of all other firms
except Honda, whose market share continued to rise gradually, as might be
expected in light of Honda's 1982 entry into U.S. production facilities that
allowed it to avoid the full impact of the Japanese VRAs. Controlling for
Honda's unique situation, there is some suggestion of the expected negative co-
variation between firm-by-firm price competitiveness from Figures 8 and 9 and




















































































































































































































































































































































































































Trends in U.S. automakers' competitiveness relative to foreign rivals, espe-
cially as measured by relative prices, seem reasonably consistent from 1976
through 1985 with trends in exchange rates, relative labor costs, and U.S. trade
policy. Table 2 summarizes how auto price competitiveness might be very roughly
decomposed over this period, as described above. A sensible agenda for ongoing
research along these lines would focus on measurement of trends in quality, pro-
duct mix, and market share, largely ignored above, and on more subtly con-






1 Early2 1970s 1980s
Impulses
Effective Nominal Roughly Roughly
"Auto Dollar" 25% 25%
decline rise
U.S. Unit Labor Little Roughly
Costs Relative change 25%
to Auto Rivals rise
Residual Impulse3 Little Roughly
(VRAs, quality, residual 50%
product mix, etc.) impulse offset
to above
Competitiveness






"Residual impulse't denotes pressure on relative auto prices that is
unaccounted for by exchange rates and labor costs, and is defined by subtracting
the first two rows of the table from the last.
That is, impulses that tended to raise prices of Japanese automakers
relative to their U.S. rivals.33
Footnotes
1Such studies include Bryan and Humpage (1984), Citrin(1985), Collyns
and Dunaway (1987), Crandall (1984, 1985, 1987), Dinopoulos and Kreinin
(1987), Dixit (1984), Feenstra (1984, 1985a,b, 1986,a,b), Gomez-Ibanez et al.
(1982, 1983), Hickok (1985), Kaplan (1986), Lambson and Richardson (1987),
Levinsohn (1987), Mannering and Winston (1987), Tarr and Morkre (1984), and
USITC (1985a).
2See, for example, Branson and Love (1986), Day (1985), and Schwartz (1985).
3
For example, the imported auto price series from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) does not seem to exist in published form prior to 1980. In
the U.S. Commerce Department's Survey of Current Business, for further example:
the price deflator for passenger-car imports is calculated to follow the BLS
1980—on series for non-Canadian imports and to follow the U.S. producer price
index for Canadian imports; and price deflators for purchases of new domestic
autos and for purchases of new imports are identical to each other, and made
to follow the U.S. consumer price index for new cars.
4For example, the Commerce Department's constant—dollar auto series in the
Survey of Current Business come from deflating current-dollar purchases of
imports by an index measuring both import prices and domestic prices, and
from deflating current-dollar domestic purchases by the same mixed-breed index.
5Weights that are shares of world trade, rather than focus-country trade,
are sometimes recommended when there is export competition in third-country
markets as well as import competition at home. For illustration, see
Feldstein and Bacchetta (1987), Pauls and Helkie (1987), and Pauls (1987).
U.S. trade weights are used here because U.S. passenger car exports, except to
Canada, are quite small.
6See Ott (1987) or Hervey and Strauss (1987) for a general discussion of
these issues.






Sum of four 0.94/0.94





Sum of four 0.932/0.93234
9The undulating path of effective exchange rates during this period may
help explain the invariance of the trajectories to the choice of fixed and
current weights. Fixed-weight (Laspeyre's) indexes overstate inflation, but
understate deflation; current—weight (Paasche) indexes understate inflation
but overstate deflation. Over an undulating price path the biases offset
each other within each weighting system.
°The Canadian share of North American passenger cars (units) produced by
GM, Ford, and Chrysler averaged 9.8 percent in 1976-78 and 11.5 percent in
1979-85 --afterthe Canadian competitiveness edge developed.
111 am indebted to Dick Marston for sharing the data with me necessary
to do these calculations and, more importantly, the benefits of his insights
on what they imply. The unit labor cost series are national-currency indexes
of compensation of employees per unit of real output (in the value added
sense) in the manufacturing sector.
seems likely to be true with respect to weakening of the dollar from
1985 to 1987, too, concentrated as it was on yen and marks.
3The eclipse would be only partial if the U.S. measure of unit labor
costs had been drawn from the auto sector alone, not from overall U.S. manu-
facturing. Wage givebacks and technological developments of the early 1980s
caused unit labor costs in autos to rise somewhat more slowly than in other
U.S. manufacturing (Collyns and Dunaway (1987, p. 154)). With similar inter—
sectoral divergence in Britain, Germany, and Japan, however, the eclipse would
be restored, since nation-to-nation relative unit labor costs would move
comparably for autos and overall manufacturing.
141he measures and weights employed allow a broader conclusion. Every U.S.
sector whose dominant rivals were Germany and/or Japan appeared increasingly
uncompetitive in world markets relative to other U.S. sectors during the 1980s.
Obviously, though, these conclusions might (or might not) be moderated by
employing sectoral unit labor costs, as discussed in the previous footnote.
5Another that plays an important role in Section III is border trade
policy, specifically the VRA5 with Japan.
16Quality is still a third important contributor to sectoral com-
petitiveness, although it is largely an endogenous choice of automakers.
Quality will usually be reflected in price as well as in inherent product
characteristics. Disentangling the price influence of trends in relative
quality and in relative competitiveness is discussed in more detail by
Feenstra (1984), and Collyns and Dunaway (1987), among others.
7See tabulations of these data in MVMA (1986, p. 38) and Kaplan (1986,
Table 2).35
18The last and most recent of its compilations is USITC(1986b). The
price series have some interest in their own right. For example, the
minimum-price series show very little divergence around trend or dispersion
across firms, and especially little for the Japanese firms. The maximum-price
series, by comparison, show much more divergence and dispersion, especially for
the U.S. firms.
19An obvious objection to this procedure is thatpercentage discounts on
autos with high list prices are probably larger than on autos with low list
prices.
20Calculated Japanese market shares of thesehighest-price models rise from
1984 to 1985, but European market shares rise even more sharply.
could be due, of course, either to competitive pressures or to
implicit price parallelism among oligopolistic firms.
22 . . . TheJapanese and U.S. price indexes are implicit price deflators, and the
'real" sales data, compared below to simple aggregates of units sold, record
annual sales valued at 1982 prices.
23Collyns and Dunaway (1987) is a noteworthy, although fairly primitive,
exception.
241n total U.S. market sales, however, real shares of smallersuppliers,
both European and Japanese, began rising in 1984.36
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